In this paper, we reconcile the disparity between regional and national level estimates of the effect of immigration on native earnings. The reconciliation derives from the fact that existing national level studies fail to adequately control for changes in other determinants of the wage structure that correspond closely with the skill distribution of immigrant shocks. We focus specifically on the effect of accounting for incarceration trends. Over the past thirty years, an increasing proportion of low skilled native workers have served time in prison, a development that has arguably harmed their employment prospects. We show that the fraction of a given education-experience group that is immigrant is strongly correlated with the fraction of native born workers in the demographic group that is institutionalized. Holding constant incarceration trends considerably diminishes the estimated magnitude of the reduced-form relationship between native labor market outcomes and the fraction in their skill cell that is immigrant.
Introduction
Since the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, the United States has experienced a sustained inflow of foreign migrants. These immigration flows increased the proportion of the U.S. resident population that is foreign born and has contributed disproportionately to U.S. population growth.
1 Moreover, the source countries and relative skill profiles of this most recent wave of migrants differ markedly from those of previous immigrants.
While most pre-1965 immigrants originated in southern and central Europe and had similar levels of educational attainment as U.S.-born natives, the most recent migrants come largely from Latin America and Southeast Asia and are on average relatively less educated (Borjas 1995 (Borjas , 1999 ).
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Recent immigration trends coupled with the low average skill levels of recent immigrants have raised concerns that immigration to the U.S. has adversely affected the earning of the least skilled native workers. Moreover, well-documented changes in the earnings distribution corresponding in time to this most recent wave -a notable increase in inequality, a sharp increase in the returns to work experience and formal education -are consistent with this conjecture.
Despite the coincidence of these trends, however, empirical research has failed to yield consistent evidence of large adverse effects of immigration. Studies that rely on geographicallyconcentrated immigrant shocks (Card 1990 , Hunt 1992 , Friedberg 2001 as well as studies that 1 In 1970, the foreign-born accounted for 4.7 percent of the U.S. population, increasing to 10.4 percent by 2000. During these three decades, the resident immigrant population increased by 18.8 million, accounting for roughly one-quarter of overall population growth (U.S. Census Bureau 2000) . 2 The educational attainment distribution of immigrants is actually bimodal, with a large concentration of migrants with very low levels of educational attainment and a smaller mass of migrants with very high level of educational attainment. For example, Card (2005) estimates that in 2000 roughly 38 percent of immigrants 18 to 64 years of age were high school dropouts compared to 15 percent of natives. At the other extreme, 22 percent of such immigrants had at least a college degree compared with 23 percent of natives. On average, however, immigrants in the U.S. have lower levels of completed schooling.
exploit cross-city variation in the relative size of the immigrant population (Altonji and Card 1991 , Pischke and Velling 1997 , Card 2001 find either no or moderate effects of immigrants on native earnings and employment. 3 However, to the extent that natives internally migrate away from areas with heavy concentrations of immigrants or that immigrants choose to locate in areas with strong labor markets, these estimates based on inter-regional variation in immigrant concentration may be positively biased.
Based on this critique, several researchers have argued for approaching the question from the national level -i.e., a level of geographic aggregation likely to capture any inter-regional migratory responses of natives. Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) simulate the effects of recent immigration trends on native earnings assuming a national production function that aggregates labor of different skill levels, using extant estimates of the substitution elasticities between labor skill levels. The authors argue that the magnitude of recent immigrant flows coupled with the particular skill composition of recent immigrants imply substantive negative effects of immigration on the earnings of relatively unskilled American workers. Borjas (2003) builds on this approach using national level data to perform a reduced form as well as a structural analysis of the effect of immigrants on the native U.S. wage structure. Both the reduced form estimates of labor wage elasticities as well as the structural analysis find that the effect of immigrants on native earnings is considerably larger than (roughly double) the estimates from the existing regional research.
In this paper, we demonstrate that these national level results are extremely sensitive to the inclusion of additional control variables and that adding one variable in particular yields reduced-form factor price elasticities from national level data that are comparable in magnitude to those from inter-regional comparisons. This reconciliation derives from the fact that existing national level studies fail to adequately account for changes in other determinants of the wage structure that correspond closely with the skill distribution of immigrant shocks. We focus specifically on the effect of accounting for incarceration trends. Over the past thirty years, an increasing proportion of low-skilled native workers have served time in prison, a development that has arguably harmed their employment prospects. We show that the fraction of a given education-experience group that is immigrant is strongly correlated with the fraction of native born workers in the demographic group that are currently institutionalized. Moreover, we find a strong negative correlation between the fraction of the group that is currently institutionalized and the earnings of the non-institutionalized members of the group. Holding constant incarceration trends considerably diminishes the estimated magnitude of the reduced-form relationship between native labor market outcomes and the fraction in their skill-cell that is
immigrant.
An alternative interpretation of these findings offered by Borjas, Grogger, and Hansen (2006) is that immigration-induced wage declines have pushed more men into criminal activity which, in turn, has increased the incarceration rate. The authors present a model whereby the reduced form effect of immigration on incarceration reflects the product of (1) the effect of immigration on wages and (2) the elasticity of labor demand in the crime sector. The latter elasticity gauges the extent to which the local crime market is able to absorb additional offenders as the quality of legitimate work opportunities (as measured by wages) diminishes. Given empirical estimates suggesting that the wage impact of immigration is comparable for black and white native workers coupled with the much larger increases in incarceration for black men in comparison to otherwise similar white men, this interpretation requires that the crime elasticity of demand for blacks be much greater than the comparable elasticity for whites. The authors speculate that developed drug markets in black neighborhoods are better able to absorb additional criminal labor than the illicit markets within which white men participate. Borjas, Grogger, and Hansen (2006) as well as our replication and simple alternative specification of these regressions are zero. Moreover, there is no evidence at the state level that black men are more easily incorporated into criminal activity than white men. Based on these results, we conclude that immigration has had no impact on criminal activity among natives operating through labor market competition.
Immigration, Incarceration, and the Labor Market Prospects of Low-Skilled Workers
Simply stated, a large increase in a nation's relative endowment of foreign-born workers should, under certain assumptions, suppress the wages of those workers most likely to be in competition with immigrants in the labor market. 4 To the extent that the distribution of the foreign-born across skill grouping differs from that of natives, immigrants are likely to suppress the wages of those workers for whom they are most substitutable while having little effect or even increasing the wages of those natives with whom they are least alike. 5 The educational attainment distribution of immigrants arriving over the past four decades has been disproportionately concentrated among the least education (those with less than a high school degree) and the most educated (college graduates, and those with advanced degrees), exhibiting greater variance and a lower average than the comparable distribution for natives. In addition, immigrants tend to be younger on average, and for some national origin groupings, disproportionately male. Thus, to the extent that recent immigration trends have impacted the wage structure, one would expect to observe declining native wages among the relatively young and the relatively less educated.
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The likely distributional effects of immigration are illustrated by the patterns in Figure 1 . PUMS samples, the figure displays the degree to which native men are in competition with the foreign born for each decade and by their position in the earnings distribution. The figure is created as follows. For each year, we first restrict the samples to adult native-born males who 5 Immigration may impact the wages of certain native skill groupings through several channels. First, in a multifactor production process, certain native groups are likely to complement immigrant labor, such as bilingual natives or skilled craftsmen in construction. In addition, to the extent that immigration reduces the overall capital-labor ratio in the short run, ensuing net capital formation will induce positive partial effects on the demand for all labor groups, and perhaps net positive effects for those natives for whom immigrants are not particularly substitutable. For a complete discussion of marginal wage effects associated with immigrant-induced capital accumulations see Peri (2006, 2008) . 6 Interestingly, the degree to which recent immigration flows have altered relative factor proportions at the national level depends in part on how one defines the difference between high and low skilled workers. If one bases this definition on detailed educational-attainment groups, such as the common four-group categorization of high school dropouts, high school graduates, some college, and college plus used here and in Borjas (2003 Borjas ( , 2005 than the skill composition of recent waves of immigrants is markedly different from that of natives. However, if one uses broader categorizations, such as high school or less and some college or more employed in Card and Lemieux (2001) , recent immigration has had a more decidedly balanced impact on the nation's factor proportions. The correct categorization clearly depends on the degree of substitutability between workers of different levels of educational attainment (Ottaviano and Perri 2008) .
are not enrolled in school. The sample is then stratified into four educational groups (high school dropouts, high school graduates, some college, and college graduates) and eight work experience groups (1 to 5 years, 6 to 10 years, 11 to 15 years, 16 to 20 years, 21 to 25 years, 26 to 30 years, 31 to 35 years, and 36 to 40 years). We drop all observations with more than 40 years of work experience. 7 We then calculated average annual earnings for all native men with positive earnings by year, education, and work experience. Using the 1960 earnings distribution, each education-experience cell is placed into one of five quintiles, thus providing the stratifying variable used in the figure.
The figure displays the fraction foreign born among all men (native and immigrant combined) in each education-experience-year group. In 1960 and 1970 there is no clear relationship between the earnings of natives and labor market competition from immigrants. In fact, age-experience groups of natives in both the bottom and top quintiles of the earnings distribution had high fractions immigrant within their labor market sector. However, in later years a clearer ordering emerges. The degree of competition between low-earning natives and immigrants in the bottom two quintiles intensifies considerably, while for the three higher earning groups, there are only slight increases.
The increase in the proportion immigrant among low-earning workers coupled with the increase in earnings inequality over this time period lends support to the hypothesis that immigrants have adversely affected of the earnings of low-wage natives. In fact, the principal result in Borjas (2003) is the demonstration of strong partial correlations between average labor market outcomes for natives and the proportion immigrant in the corresponding educationexperience cell. However, there have been other developments over the past four decades that are likely to have had disproportionate impacts on the earnings of low-wage natives and that are also likely to be correlated with the degree of labor market competition from immigrants. In this paper, we focus on the astounding increase in the fraction of low-skilled men who have served time in a state or federal prison.
Having served time is likely to negatively impact one's earnings through a host of channels. To begin, former inmates are likely to have fewer years of non-institutionalized work experience relative to those who have not been incarcerated. The median prisoner serves roughly two years on a given prison term (Raphael and Stoll 2005) and many serve more than one term for any given court commitment (Raphael 2005) . 8 Thus, for any imputed age-education grouping, the higher the fraction that has served time the greater the disparity between actual and imputed labor market experience, a factor that is likely to suppress the average earnings of the defined demographic group. Furthermore, serving time may negatively affect one's stock of human capital through the depreciation of skills while idle or the erosion of soft skills among those who develop anti-social attitudes while incarcerated.
In addition, many employers are reluctant to hire, or categorically exclude from consideration, job applicants that have criminal history records. Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll (2007) find a consistent and strong reluctance on the part of employers of low-skilled workers to hire those with criminal history records, although a fair proportion of employers are willing to consider mitigating factors such as the severity of the offense and the length of time that has elapsed since release. In addition, several recent audit studies of employer hiring patterns documents large negative effects of having a criminal history record on the likelihood of being called back following an interview (Pager 2003, Pager and Western 2005) .
Finally, being the member of a demographic group that has a high fraction of members with prior prison time is likely to adversely impact the labor market prospects of members of this group who do not have criminal history records via statistical discrimination. For example, Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll (2006) show that employers who formally check the criminal background of job applicants are more likely to hire black workers, even after controlling for the racial composition of the applicant pool. Moreover, this positive effect is greatest among those employers with the strongest stated aversion to ex-offenders. The conclusions that the authors draw from these patterns is that in the absence of perfect information regarding prior criminal activity, employers use perceived correlates of past criminality to screen out applicants with criminal history records. In a similar vein, Autor and Scarborough (2008) show that formal screening does not adversely effect the hiring of low-skilled minority workers, despite their observable lower average qualification, a pattern consistent with statistically discriminatory hiring.
These factors -foregone labor market experience, human capital depreciation while incarcerated, the stigmatization of ex-offenders in the labor market, and statistical discrimination against workers from high offending groups -should suppresses the average wages and employment of workers in groups with large fractions that have served prior prison spells. And indeed, the few studies that have tested for such effects find consistently negative effects of overall incarceration rates on labor market outcomes (see Holzer, Offner, and Sorensen 2005, and Raphael 2005) .
Unfortunately, one cannot measure the fraction of each demographic group with prior prison time using census data. However, it is possible to measure the fraction of each group currently incarcerated, a variable that is likely to be highly correlated with the fraction of the group that has served prison time in the past. 9 See Butcher and Piehl (1998) for an analysis of incarceration among immigrant men that also uses the group quarter variable to identify the incarcerated. Raphael (2005) compares estimates of the institutionalized population from the census to estimates of the incarcerated populations from the National Prisoner Statistics tabulated in (Beck, Karberg, and Harrison (2002) . Given the inclusive nature of the census definition of institutionalization, the census estimates are slightly larger than the BJS numbers for groups defined by race and ethnicity. Nonetheless, the two sets of estimates correspond quite closely and the differences are small. 10 At the national level in 2001, the number of non-institutionalized men with prior prison histories (roughly 4.3 million) is approximately 3.3 times the population of current prison inmates (1.3 million) (Bonczar 2003) . 11 We are effectively using the earnings of non-institutionalized employed men to impute the potential earnings of those in their education-experience cell that are currently institutionalized.
A comparison of figures 1 and 2 reveal very similar patterns in these two potential determinants of wages. While the ordering of the immigrant competition variable is unstable over time, we do see very large increases in potential supply side pressure from immigration among the least skilled workers, and much smaller increases among higher paid workers.
Similarly, the greatest increases in incarceration rates occur among the lowest earners, with basically no change among high-wage education-experience groups. To explore the co- 
Reduced-Form Estimates of the Effects of Immigrants on Native Labor Market Outcomes Using National Level Data
In this section, we explore the effect of adjusting for incarceration trends on reducedform estimates of the elasticity of wages with respect to immigration-induced changes in labor supply. Following Borjas (2003) we estimate the equation (1) where ejt y is an average labor market outcome for native men in education group e, in experience group j, in year t, ej α is an intercept for the education-experience group ej, et β provides education specific time effects, and jt χ provides experience group specific time effects.
The variable We estimate equation (1) using data from the 1960 through 2000 PUMS files. Again, the sample is restricted to men with one to forty years of labor market experience. We use this sample to calculate average outcomes for groups stratified into cells defined by all possible combinations of the four educational attainment groups and eight experience groups discussed above. We then analyze the effects of immigration competition on three native labor market outcomes: average log of annual earnings, average log of weekly earnings, and the fraction of the prior year employed. For the log annual and weekly earnings variables, the sample is necessarily restricted to those with positive earnings. We use all non-institutionalized native men to calculate the proportion of the previous year employed (dividing weeks worked by 52).
Our principal strategy in this section is to estimate Equation (1) data. Such national level estimates identify the effect of immigration on native outcomes using variation within education-experience groups over time in immigrant penetration and should not be subject to a diffusion bias operating through the internal migration choices of natives. 13 Table   1 The weighted regression estimates reveal even greater sensitivity of the estimated immigration effects to omitting institutionalization rates. For the log-annual earnings models, adjusting for institutionalization rates diminished the immigration effect by nearly three quarters.
For weekly earnings, this effect is reduced to zero (though an imprecisely measured zero).
13 Note, when the dependent variable equals wages, the inclusion of education-experience fixed effects and education-time effects yields a partial correlation that is inversely proportional to the elasticity of substitution between workers of different experience levels within education groups, holding the capital stock constant and assuming that labor is aggregated and transformed into output within a nested CES production technology. This reduced form coefficient will not reflect either the short or long run factor price elasticity of native wages in response to an immigration-induced labor supply shock, as such a shock will further impact own wages through its effect on the overall supply of workers within an education group, an effect on the overall labor supply aggregate, and an effect on the capital stock. See Perri (2006, 2008) for a discussion of this point.
Again, the estimated effect of immigrants on native employment is not affected by controlling for institutionalization rates.
To interpret these results, it is useful to convert the coefficient estimates in Table 1 into something approximating the elasticity of native wages with respect to immigrant induced labor supply shocks. Borjas (2003) provides a simple derivation for doing so. Let M ejt be the number of immigrants in group ejt, N ejt be the corresponding count of natives, and m ejt be defined by M ejt / N ejt where m ejt is interpreted as the proportional extent to which immigrants increase the supply of labor for native group ejt. For the wage and earnings models, the coefficient δ in equation (1) provides the estimate of the partial derivate of log earnings with respect to the proportion immigrant. To calculate the effect of a proportional increase in labor supply on native earnings, one needs to further calculate the derivative of the proportion immigrant with respect to m ejt .
Doing so 14 yields a marginal effect of a change in m ejt on log earnings of (2) In our data from the 2000 census, the weighted average value of m ejt is 0.152. Thus multiplying the coefficient on proportion immigrant in Table 1 reduced this estimate to -0.142. For the un-weighted models, the log annual earnings-supply elasticity estimates decline from -0.688 to -0.412. For the weighted weekly earnings estimates, the elasticity estimate declines from -0.309 to zero. For the weekly earnings estimates from the un-weighted results, the elasticity estimates declined from -0.42 to -0.23. Thus in all models, accounting for institutionalization trends leads to an appreciably lower elasticity estimates. Borjas (2003) . For annual earnings, the models omitting institutionalization rates reveal large negative effects of immigration for lesser educated workers (largest for high school graduates), an insignificant effect for those with some college, and a positive and significant effect for college graduates. Holding constant the proportion institutionalized does not affect the immigration estimate for high school dropouts, wipes out the immigration effect for high school graduates, and increases the positive effects of immigration on earnings for higher educated workers. We observe comparable results for the log weekly earnings models. Again, we find little impact of adjusting for institutionalization rates on the immigration-employment effects in these models. However, unlike the models in Table 1 , we find no evidence of a negative effect of immigration on employment in any of the models, with and without controlling for institutionalization.
Reduced-Form Estimates of the Effects of Immigrants on Native Labor Market Outcomes Using State Level Data
The emphasis in Borjas (2003) and Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) on national level analysis is driven by the author's aforementioned concerns regarding the bias to regional estimates of immigrant competition effects driven by the inter-regional mobility of natives. A key result in Borjas (2003) is that when the reduced form regressions presented above are estimated at the state level, the implied factor price elasticities are considerably smaller. One interpretation of this difference in results is that the shock to any one state associated with international migration is passed through to other states, and thus a geographically disaggregated research design will necessarily understate the labor market effects of immigration.
An alternative interpretation based on the findings in Tables 1 and 2 is that a state level analysis permits more precise adjustment for national trends in other determinants of wage and employment patterns, adjustments that are not possible in the national level models. In other words, the immigration share variable in the national level regressions is partially proxying for these omitted factors. For example, if we re-tabulate our group averages of native outcomes, immigration shares, and native institutionalization rates at the state level, equation (1) Note, the inclusion of additional two-way interaction between education and state and experience and state as well as state and time further adjust the data for any inter-regional differences in native earnings that may be correlated with immigrant share variable. Most importantly, the three-way interaction fixed effects for specific education-experience-time cells allows adjusting Interestingly, the correlation between changes in immigration shares and institutionalization rates are considerably weaker when measured at the state level. Figure 5 presents a scatter plot of decade-to-decade changes in immigration shares against changes in institutionalization rates, where the unit of analysis is the decade change in the state-experienceeducation cells over the period 1960 to 2000. Both series have been adjusted for decade-fixed effects. The correlation between these two variables is considerably weaker (0.25) than the correlation observed in the national data. Thus, one would expect the estimated effects of immigrant shares to be less sensitive to the omission of the institutionalization rate.
An interesting exercise is to compare the results from estimation of the state level equation (3) to those from the national level model given by equation (1) with and without adjusting for institutionalization rates. To the extent that the immigration effect estimates in Table 1 controlling for incarceration trends are comparable in magnitude to the estimates using equation (3) and not controlling for incarceration, than the disparity between national and state level estimates presented in Borjas (2003) more likely reflects omitted variables at the national level that can be controlled for through fixed effects in a state level model. Card and Lemieux (2001) show that the changes in the returns to education during the 1980s were not constant across the age distribution. Being able to non-parametrically control for these changes at the state level by interacting education/experience dummies with time dummies is clearly an improvement over the education-time effects and experience-time effects that are possible in a national level analysis. inter-variable correlation in Figure 5 ).
There are several interesting patterns in these annual wage results that bear mentioning.
First, the estimated effects of immigration share (ranging from -0.19 to -0.24) do not differ from the corresponding point estimate from the national level regressions that controls for institutionalization rates (-0.188 in Table 1 , although this effect is quite imprecisely measured).
Thus, once institutionalization is added to the national model, the state level and national level estimates are consistent with one another.
Second, while the institutionalization rate exerts a significant and negative effect on annual earnings in the models in Table 3 , the point estimates of its marginal effect in the state level regressions (ranging from -0.37 to -0.74) are considerably lower than the point estimate from the corresponding weighted regression using national level data (approximately -2). This disparity in magnitude for incarceration rates is surely not driven by the endogenous residential choices of natives. The more likely explanation is that in a national level analysis with sparse controls for the myriad of factors affecting the wage distribution over the past four decades, the institutionalization rate is partially proxying for these omitted variables.
The results for log weekly earnings are comparable. The point estimates for the effects of immigrant share are all negative and significant and range from -0.16 to -0.19. Again, these estimates are consistent with the national level estimates controlling for institutionalization (which is essentially zero in Table 1 ). Converting these effects to native wage/immigrant supply elasticities suggests that a 10 percent immigration-induced increase in supply results in a reduction in native wages ranging from 1.2 to 1.4 percent. Note, these values are essentially in line with the findings from cross-regional studies of the wage effects of immigration. 16 Again, institutionalization exerts significant negative effects on weekly wages in both models in Table   3 . The point estimates are lower than those reported in Table 1 and decline when educationexperience-time effects are added to the model.
The results for the fraction of the year employed differ considerably from those presented in Table 1 . First, in contrast to the results for the national level models, institutionalization rates exert strong negative effects on employment in all specifications. Second, the coefficients on immigrant share are considerably smaller than the corresponding national estimates.
Is Immigration Causing the Increase in Incarceration Rates?
The empirical results thus far have demonstrated several patterns. First, using variation across skill groups and over time at the national level, we demonstrate a strong correlation between the changes in the share of men foreign born and the proportion of natives that are incarcerated. Second, we show that adding the proportion of natives incarcerated to the national level earnings models greatly attenuates the partial effect of immigrant penetration on earnings.
Finally, we show that these alternative national estimates of the effect of immigrants on native earnings are comparable in magnitude to reduced form estimates using state-level data. The state-level model results are robust to controlling for state level incarceration rates, as changes in immigrant penetration and incarceration rates at the state level are only weakly correlated.
In a recent working paper, Borjas, Grogger, and Hansen (2006) (hereafter referred to as BGH (2006)) offer an alternative interpretation of the national level relationship between changes in immigrant penetration across skill groups and changes in native incarceration rates.
The authors present a model whereby individuals rationally choose to either work, participate in crime, or not participate in either the legitimate or illegitimate markets based on a comparison of the returns to working in both sectors and the personal valuation of leisure time. The hypothesized connection between immigration and incarceration operates through the following
channel. An immigration-induced supply shock lowers wages in the legal labor market, increasing the relative returns to crime and the relative attractiveness of leisure. In response to the shock, some natives withdraw from the labor market and move into either criminal activity or idleness. A relatively larger proportion of these marginal natives will become criminals when the illegitimate market can easily absorb additional criminal participants -i.e., when the demand curve for criminal labor is fairly elastic. In the face of an inelastic demand curve in the crime sector (due to say a rapidly vanishing stock of criminal opportunities), returns to criminal activity will decline quickly with additional participants driving those natives on the margin into idleness. Thus, this model predicts that greater labor market competition with immigrants will
(1) lower the legitimate wages of native, (2) increase the proportion of natives not employed, and (3) increase the proportion of natives incarcerated. The latter finding requires that participation in criminal activity increase the risk of incarceration, a clearly plausible assumption.
With regards to the results presented in the previous section, the implicit critique of our findings raised by BGH (2006) is obvious. To the extent that native incarceration rates are being determined by immigration-induced wage changes, or wage changes more generally, the native incarceration rate is endogenous and does not belong on the right hand side of the regression equation. Absent an instrument for incarceration rates in the national level equation, either our interpretation of these patterns or the interpretation offered in BGH (2006) is consistent with the data.
Nonetheless, there are several aspects of recent wage and incarceration trends that pose problems for this alternative interpretation. First, much of the increase in incarceration rates post 1980 can be explained by increases in the likelihood of serving time conditional on committing specific crimes as well as an increase in the expected value of time served within offense categories. As the incarceration risk and time served conditional on crime committed are largely policy variables, these facts suggest that the lion's share of the increase in incarceration is being driven by policy rather than behavioral determinants. Indeed, Raphael and Stoll (2007) show that at least 85 percent, and perhaps more, of the increase in incarceration is attributable to stiffer sentencing policies along both the extensive and intensive margins.
Second, a close examination of Figure 2 reveals incarceration increases during the 1990s
that are comparable in magnitude to those experienced during the 1980s, despite the fact that wage declines for the least skilled were considerably larger during the earlier periods relative to the latter. This fact is further illustrated in Table 4 which presents the average log weekly earnings for each year and each of the four educational groupings along side the comparable institutionalization levels. For the least skilled workers, the largest increases in incarceration occur during the 1990s while the largest earnings declines occur during the 1980s. In fact, wage changes across decades for this group appear unrelated to changes in incarceration rates in most instances, with the strong earnings growth during the 1960s corresponding to a slight increase in the incarceration rate and the beginning of the earnings decline during the 1970s corresponding to a small increase that appears to be a continuation of trend. Similarly, for high school there are no strong arguments that would lead one a priori to suppose that the structure of these markets differ by the race of the participant.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, despite the authors' assertion to the contrary the state level empirical patterns that both we and they present are inconsistent with a reverse causal effect of immigration on incarceration rates operating through wages. In fact, given the significant, albeit smaller, effect of immigration on weekly wages in the state level regression analysis documented in the previous section, state level estimates of the relationship between immigration and incarceration provide a direct specification test of the model offered in BGH (2006).
To elaborate on this point, we briefly discuss the theoretical model in BGH (2006) and the national and state level reduced form regressions that directly follow. The model assumes that within skills groups, black workers, white workers, and immigrants are perfect substitutes and that while native workers of all races participate in criminal activity, immigrants do not. The elasticity of demand in the legitimate labor market is constrained to being constant across all racial/nativity groups while the elasticity of demand in the criminal sector as well as the demand elasticity for leisure are permitted to vary. The solution of this model using national level data provides four reduced form equations relating wages, the number of natives participating in criminal activity, the number of natives idle, and the stock of employed natives to the immigrant induced supply shock. For our purposes, we focus on the two equations pertaining to wages and criminal activity. parameters in these two equations are the factor price elasticity in the formal labor market, η f <0, equal to the inverse of the labor demand elasticity, and the factor price elasticity in the criminal market, η ic <0, equal to the inverse of the labor demand elasticity in the criminal sector. The final parameter, 1≥ ρ ≥0 is an elasticity-weighted measure of the market sector participation rates of natives. This parameter dulls the responsiveness of factor prices to supply shocks relative to what we would otherwise observe if labor supply was perfectly inelastic.
Equations (4a) and (4b) clearly describe the hypothesized connection between immigration supply shocks and incarceration among natives. The reduced-form effect of the supply shock on formal sector wages is given by the product of the factor price elasticity and the participation rate, η f ρ. The effect on legitimate wages will be larger the smaller the formal sector elasticity of demand (or equivalently, the larger in absolute value is η f ).
The reduced form effect of the immigrant shock on the log of the stock of natives participating in crime is given by the product of the effect of immigration on legitimate wages, η f ρ, and the elasticity of demand for labor in the criminal sector, 1/η ic . A larger (more negative) elasticity in the crime sector translates into a larger increase in the stock of natives participating criminally engaged, idle) will now depend on both the regional immigrant supply shock as well as the national immigrant supply shock for a given skill group. For wages and the stock of natives participating in crime, the derived reduced form relationships are given by the equations (5a) ( 5b) where all variables are defined as above but wages and the stock of criminal participants vary at the racial group (i), state (r), skill (s), and year (t) level, and the right hand side of the equation depends on both the regional supply shock to skill group s caused by immigration (m rst ) as well as the national immigration-induced supply shock to this group (m st ). The only additional parameter in equations (5a) and (5b) is σ. This parameter measures the elasticity of native interregional migration in response to regional wage disparities created by regionally-imbalanced immigration flows.
The impact of this migratory response on the regional effect of immigration on wages is evident by looking at the coefficient in the wage equation (5a) on the regional migration shock, m rst . The regional wage effect of the immigration shock is equal to the reduced form wage effect observed in the national level wage regression, η f ρ, multiplied by an adjustment factor (1+ση f ρ), where in both Borjas (2006) and BGH (2006) , it is assumed that 0 < (1+ση f ρ) < 1. Since η f ρ <0, this adjustment factor is smaller the greater the internal migration response of natives to regional wage differences. In other words, the more responsive native migration is to regional immigration shocks, the weaker the correlation between native wages measured at the subnational level and local immigration shocks. Similarly, equation (5b) Despite the smaller effects at the regional level, to the extent that there is a significant regional effect on wages one can still use the state-level regression to identify the elasticity of demand in the criminal sector. In fact, taking the ratio of the coefficient on regional immigration shock in the crime equation (5b) to the comparable coefficient in the wage equation (5a) again gives the labor demand elasticity in the crime sector, 1/η ic . Indeed, if the model offered in BGH is correct, this ratio should match the comparable estimate one obtains by constructing the similar ratio from the national level regressions specified in equations (4a) and (4b).
However, we know from the results already presented that this cannot be the case. Using national level data, the regressions in Table 1 (omitting institutionalization from the specification) finds strong statistically significant relationships between immigrant penetration in a native skill group on native earnings outcomes while Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate a strong positive relationship between changes in immigrant penetration and changes in incarceration. In combination, these two patterns suggest an elastic labor demand curve in the crime sector. By contrast, the regression results in Table 3 shows a statistically-significant (yet smaller) effect of immigration on native earnings outcomes at the state level while Figure 5 demonstrates a weak relationship between changes in immigrant penetration and changes in native incarceration rates at the state level. In combination, these results suggest an elastic demand curve for crime using the national level correlation but an inelastic labor demand curve in the crime sector using the state level results.
To make this point more formally, we estimate various specifications of equations (4a), (4b), (5a), and (5b) and reproduce the estimation results from BGH (2006) in order to highlight the inconsistency between the national-level and state-level results. With regards to the nationallevel models, we estimate the regression equation (6a) (6b) where (6a) uses the log weekly earnings as the dependent variable and (6b) provides the grouped-logit specification for the institutionalization rate, and where the subscripts are defined as in the first half of this paper. 19 The interaction of education groups (indexed by e) and experience groups (indexed by j) define skill groupings. The variable Immig ejt is the proportion of the skill group ej that is immigrant and each specification includes education-experience, education-time, and experience-time fixed effects. Equations (6a) and (6b) are estimated separately for white and black native-born males. As in BGH (2006), we present separate estimates by race to provide a test of the hypothesis that the elasticity of demand in the criminal sector is higher for blacks than whites. After estimating (6a) and (6b), the labor demand elasticity in the crime sector can be estimate by multiplying the ratio of coefficient estimates,
, by one minus the average group incarceration rate.
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To estimate the state-level equations, we pursue two separate approaches. Note, the reduced form relationships in (5a) and (5b) include the national-level immigrant-penetration shock in the specification. This variable varies with skill-group and time but not with region. 19 We employ a grouped-logit estimator to maintain consistency with BGH (2006) . 20 The elasticity is not equal to the simple ratio due to the fact that the dependent variable in equation (6b) is the log-odds ratio for the incarceration rate and not the log stock of criminals. The appendix demonstrates that under the assumption that the number of incarcerated in a given skill group equals the stock of criminals for this group, labor demand elasticity in the criminal sector will be proportional to the ratio of the reduced-form coefficients in (6a) and (6b). where the subscript r has been added to denote the state level variation in the data, and the models include fixed effects for education-experience-time groups (effectively capturing the national-level group specific immigration shock), education-experience-state groups, and statetime groups. A comparison of the implicit criminal labor demand elasticity from estimating (7a) and (7b) to the comparable implied elasticity from estimating (6a) and (6b) where the specification now includes the immigration shock measured at the higher level of aggregation. Specified in this manner, the state-level regression provides an alternative test of whether the state-level patterns support the theoretical model presented in BGH (2006) . In the reduced-form equations (5a) and (5b), we have already noted that taking the ratio of the coefficient on the state-level immigration shock in the crime equation to the comparable coefficient in the wage equation yields a number proportional to the labor demand elasticity in the crime sector. However, calculating the same ratio using the coefficients on the national level immigration shock yields the same quantity. Thus, the BGH (2006) model implies that once we estimate equations (8a) and (8b), we should find that
. To the extent that this is not the case, the model is rejected by the data. Table 5 presents several estimates of the national level reduced form regressions given by equations (6a) and (6b) as well as estimates of the state-level reduced form equations specified in equations (7a) and (7b) that include time-skill group fixed effects to capture the omitted national level immigration shock variable. Column (1) reports the coefficient on immigrant penetration variable, column (2) reports the marginal effect of the immigration shock variable on the institutionalization probability, while column (3) Tables 5 and 6 . In particular, they present results from an instrumental variables model, results controlling for an indicator of crack cocaine usage, and results that restrict the education-experience-time interactions to allow for a structural break post 1980. Their estimation results are fairly constant across specifications.
(7a) and (7b). For all three sets of estimates, we present separate estimation results for black and white males. In all models, we use a weighting scheme similar to that used in BGH (2006). black incarceration yet insignificant effects for whites. While our point estimates are qualitatively similar to those of BGH, our standard errors are somewhat larger, and thus the effect of immigration on the incarceration rate for blacks is no longer significant. Focusing on the point estimates, however, both imply that the elasticity of demand in the criminal sector is much larger for blacks than whites (a necessary condition for their model to offer a partial explanation of racially-disparate trends in incarceration rates).
The state-level regressions, however, yield contrasting results. As with our estimates discussed above, the marginal effects of immigration are substantially smaller. Nonetheless, these wage effects are highly significant and precisely measured for both black and white men.
The marginal effects of changes in immigration on incarceration are effectively zero for both black and white men with small identical negative point estimates for both. The elasticity estimates in the final column have the wrong sign and is larger for whites than for blacks. Thus, the empirical estimation of the state level relationships derived directly from the model presented in BGH (2006) do not support their interpretation of the national level correlations. there is no measurable effect on state-level incarceration rates for either black or white males. In both sets of results, the implied labor demand elasticity in the criminal sector using the statelevel variation differ markedly from the comparable elasticity using the national level variation (with the relatively large elasticity on the state level variables from the BGH results dependent on a statistically insignificant relationship between the proportion immigrant and native incarceration).
Based on these patterns, we conclude that the contention that immigration is in part driving national incarceration trends does not survive a simple specification check implied by the author's own theoretical model, and that immigration is unrelated to the massive increase in native incarceration rates over the past three decades.
Conclusion
The findings of this paper are several. First, in a reduced form analysis of native labor market outcomes using national level data, we find that the predicted effect of immigration on native earnings is quite sensitive to controls for at least one other determinant of wages, namely the native incarceration rate. Adjusting for incarceration rates diminishes the estimated immigration effect on annual earnings and wages. In fact, after the inclusion of this single additional explanatory variable, the implied earnings effects of immigrants from national level regressions are comparable in magnitude to the much smaller effects found in a state level panel analysis.
Second, we demonstrate that within the context of the theoretical model offered in BGH (2006), a significant effect of immigration on state level wages should induce a proportionally comparable effect on native incarceration rates when compared with the incarceration response in national level data. The lack of such an impact on incarceration rates leads us to reject the hypothesis that immigration is in part driving recent native incarceration trends.
Given that male immigrants account for roughly fifteen percent of prime age males in the U.S. in 2000, the results here beg the question of why immigration does not have a larger effect on native wages. One potential explanation is provided by capital accumulation. Borjas (2005) and Peri (2006, 2008) , show that capital accumulation (in response to immigration induced increases in capital productivity) can potentially offset a substantial portion of the negative effects of immigrants on native earnings. Certainly, international capital mobility is sufficient to respond to international differences in returns, a factor that will certainly dampen the factor price effects of international migration.
In a similar vein, international migration is likely to partially displace international trade between the sending and receiving countries. To the extent that the factor content of this displaced trade is comparable to the skill content migration flows, international migration will in part alter the location of where some tradable goods are produced (from the source to the destination country). This trade diversionary effect of immigration will also partially offset the negative effects of immigration on wages that one would observe in a closed economy.
A further possible explanation lies in the likely imperfect substitutability between immigrants and natives within well defined skill groups. While the degree of substitutability is an unsettled question (see the recent papers by Borjas, Grogger, and Hansen (2008) and Ottaviano and Peri (2008) ), a finite immigrant-native elasticity of substitution certainly concentrated the wage impacts of recent immigration on immigrants themselves.
Appendix: Derivation of the Elasticity of Demand in the Crime Sector from the ReducedForm Wage and Incarceration Equations
The empirical models specified in equations (6) through (8) are not identical to the reduced form equations derived from the BGH (2006) model as specified in equations (4) and (5). Specifically, in the specified criminality equation we have substituted the native incarceration rate for the stock of native criminals. Furthermore, the key immigrant competition variable is expressed as the ratio of immigrants over the sum of immigrants and natives within a given skill group, rather than the ratio of immigrants to native. With these slight differences, the ratio of the immigration coefficient in the incarceration equation to the immigration coefficient in the wage equation does not equal the labor elasticity of demand in the criminal sector as specified in BGH (2006) . Nonetheless, with an additional assumption, it is easy to show that this ratio is proportional to the desired elasticity and that a simple multiplicative adjustment yields the desired parameter.
To see this, note that the reduced form equation imply that the criminal demand elasticity is given by
where m s =M s /N s is the ratio of immigrants to natives in skill group s. Assuming that the number of prisoners in group is equals the stock of criminal participants and ignoring the fixed effects in the empirical specifications, the equations estimated in Table 5 With the grouped-logit specification of the incarceration equation, the marginal effects on the incarceration probability expressed in Tables 5 and 6 are given by
where Inst is the average incarceration rate for the group in question. Thus, tabulating the ratio of the marginal effect of the immigrant shock on incarceration to the marginal effect of the immigrant shock on wages and then multiplying by one over the average incarceration rate for the group in question yields the elasticity of demand in the criminal sector. The parameters tabulated in Tables 5 and 6 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 -1960 1980 -1970 1990 -1980 2000 -1990 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970-1960 1980-1970 1990-1980 2000-1990 (2) are estimates of the marginal effects of the immigrant penetration variable in (6b) and not the coefficient on this variable. Finally, the ratio of the estimate in column (2) to the estimate in column (1) is a gauge of the degree to which the criminal sector is able to absorb additional participants. Separate model estimates are presented for black and white males. The state-level models correspond to equations (7a) and (7b) in the text and include educationexperience-time effects to account for the specification implied by the theoretical model in BGH (2006) . a. See the appendix for the derivation of the labor demand elasticity in the crime sector. a. See the appendix for the derivation of the labor demand elasticity in the criminal sector.
